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CAN EMPLOYERS PUT GENETIC INFORMATION  
TO GOOD USE? 
KATHLEEN C. ENGEL1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In my talk today I am going to try to answer the question: Can employers put 
genetic information to good use?  Preparing this talk was a challenge because it 
required me to switch sides of the table.  Having represented plaintiffs in 
employment discrimination cases for ten years, my inclination is to focus on the 
ways that employers can use genetic information to the detriment of their workers.  I 
chose to talk about the value of genetic information from the employers’ perspective 
because I wanted to force myself to engage in a disciplined study of the issues, rather 
than simply don the hat of an employee advocate.  
Many employee advocates argue that employers should never have any access to 
their employees’ genetic information.  What I want to do today is identify situations 
in which employers could use employees’ genetic information to benefit themselves 
and their employees.  In giving these examples, I am not advocating that employers 
have unlimited access to employees’ genetic information.  Rather, I am suggesting 
that with adequate controls there is the potential for employers to utilize employees’ 
genetic information in ways that are socially valuable.  
For the purposes of this talk, I am focusing on employees whose genetic 
propensities for certain diseases are not yet expressed, understanding, of course, 
what Dr. Zahka said earlier, that this can be a hard line to draw.   There are two ways 
to think about using genetic information in the employment context.  One is to look 
at an individual employee’s genetic information, and the other is to focus on the 
genetic traits represented by a pool of employees.2  
II.  ACCESS TO INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE’S GENETIC INFORMATION  
I will turn first to genetic information about individual employees.  Employers 
could use genetic information to identify “costly” employees, i.e. those employees 
whose genome indicates that they could develop diseases that could lead to increased 
health insurance costs, absenteeism, disability claims, and workers’ compensation 
claims.3  Clearly, without the threat of sanctions, many employers will use this 
information to refuse to hire or to terminate employees who are likely to become 
                                                                
1Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State 
University.  I am grateful to my research assistants, Melissa Horn and Matthew Taylor, for the 
many contributions they made to the conference and this talk. 
2Employers can obtain collective information about their employees by, for example, 
having a third party test the employees and then create a genetic profile of the group of 
employees. 
3Elaine Draper, The Screening of America: the Social and Legal Framework of 
Employers’ Use of Genetic Information, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 286, 289 (1999). 
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expensive in these ways.  I think we can agree that no good comes from this sort of 
genetic discrimination.   
When, in this talk, I highlight ways that employers could put genetic information 
to good use, I am not advocating for these discriminatory employment practices.  
Indeed, we should not even consider endorsing “good” uses for genetic information 
until effective protections against genetic discrimination are in place.   
A.  Identifying Employees Who are Susceptible to Developing Specific Diseases 
Employers could use employees’ genetic information to provide preventative 
medical care.  For example, if a genetic test revealed that an employee was at risk for 
developing diabetes, an employer could refer the employee to an employee 
assistance plan that could recommend preventative measures that might actually 
decrease the odds of the employee developing diabetes.4  Several years ago, Wells 
Fargo implemented a twenty-four hour disease management program for its 
employees with diabetes.5  Although the Wells Fargo employees were already 
symptomatic, there is no reason why similar programs could not be implemented 
proactively with the goal of reducing the expression of genetic diseases.  
The potential benefits of proactive programs are obvious.  Employers could 
experience a reduction in their health and disability insurance claims, lower 
absenteeism and turnover, increased worker productivity, and better returns on any 
investments they make in training employees.  It is also possible that insurance 
companies would discount insurance premiums for employers who implemented 
these types of programs.  From the employees’ perspective, employer-sponsored 
medical assistance programs could improve their overall well-being and, in some 
cases, prolong their lives.  Society would benefit as well.  Whenever we can reduce 
the likelihood that diseases will develop, we generate savings for the social welfare 
system.  Lastly, to the extent that employees would depend on family members or 
friends for care taking if they became ill, testing and early interventions could relieve 
the potential burden on caretakers.  
B.  Identifying Employees Who are Particularly Vulnerable to Workplace Hazards 
If employers were able to identify employees with genetic traits that make them 
unusually susceptible to developing diseases if exposed to workplace toxins or if 
engaged in specific activities, employers could make job assignments that would 
reduce these employees’ exposure to the suspect toxins or activities.6  For example, 
                                                                
4Cf. Kathy Farmer, Medical Confidentiality: While it Carries Strong Humanistic Appeal, 
The Notion of Sealing Off Employee Medical Records Has a Huge Potential Downside For 
Benefits Management, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, Jan. 1, 1999, (discussing the impact medical 
confidentiality laws have on employers’ ability to provide medical screening and preventative 
health care programs to employees).  
5Id. 
6Mark Rothstein, The Use of Genetic Information for Nonmedical Purposes, 9 J. L. & 
HEALTH 109, 111 (1994-95); see also, Melinda Kaufmann, Genetic Discrimination in the 
Workplace: an Overview of Existing Protections, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 393, 393-94 (1999) 
(citing evidence that a handful of employers are already screening employees for genetic 
susceptibilities to workplace toxins). 
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as Commissioner Miller mentioned yesterday, there is evidence that some people 
may have a genetic predisposition to developing beryllium disease.7  Beryllium is a 
metal that is used in the manufacture of a wide range of products, from fluorescent 
lights to automobile circuit boards.  Genetic testing for the propensity to develop 
beryllium disease would enable employers to place vulnerable employees in 
positions where they would not be exposed to beryllium.  
Arguably, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)8 and the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (OSHA)9 already require this type of intervention to protect 
employees from workplace hazards.  Under the ADA, employers are required to 
make reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities.10  If genetic 
predispositions constitute “disabilities” under the ADA, employers may have an 
obligation to insulate workers, who because of their genetic makeup, are susceptible 
to developing certain diseases if exposed to workplace toxins or hazards.  Likewise, 
an OSHA requirement that employers eliminate significant workplace hazards 
arguably includes the requirement to test employees to determine whether they are 
unusually vulnerable to workplace toxins.11  
C.  Genetic Monitoring of Employees Who are Exposed to Workplace Hazards 
Genetic monitoring of employees who are exposed to workplace hazards could 
also be beneficial.  For example, monitoring the genetic makeup of employees could 
permit employers to establish if and when employees exceed acceptable levels of 
exposure.12  Similarly, genetic monitoring could enable employers to identify 
workplace hazards that have not yet been identified as toxic.  For example, if 
                                                                
7At least one company, Brush Wellman, is providing employees with the option of having 
third parties test them for genetic traits that could increase the employees’ risk of developing 
diseases if exposed to workplace toxins.  See generally, T. Shawn Taylor, Mapping of Human 
Genome Could Make Way for Genetic Testing by Employees, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 2001.  The 
employer pays for the tests, but only the third party testers and the employees know the 
results.  Id. 
I somewhat cynically believe that when employers offer this test, they are motivated in 
part by the possibility that the testing could help them defend any future tort claims brought by 
workers who elected not to take the test or by workers who tested positively for the genetic 
traits and continued to work in positions that entailed exposure to the particular toxins.  This 
situation bears some similarity to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson 
Controls.  Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).  Johnson 
Controls excluded pregnant and fertile women from working with lead, in part, because it 
wanted to insulate itself from tort claims that might arise if women who worked with lead had 
children with lead-related disabilities.  Id. at 191-92.  The Supreme Court required Johnson 
Controls to give women the choice whether to work with lead.  Id. at 211.  In the process, the 
Court likely provided the company with a strong defense to future tort claims based on injuries 
arising from fetal exposure to lead. 
842 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (1999). 
942 U.S.C. §§ 651, et seq. 
1042 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
11Kaufmann, supra note 6, at 425-26. 
12Id. at 398-99. 
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employees underwent regular genetic testing and the testing revealed unexplained 
changes in the employees’ genetic makeup, this information could be helpful in 
identifying toxins in the workplace.  
D.  Access to Genetic Information for Use in Health Emergencies  
Genetic information could also be valuable when an employee becomes seriously 
ill on the job.  If an employer knew that a particular employee had a genetic 
susceptibility to a given disease and then the employee exhibited symptoms 
consistent with that disease, the employer’s knowledge could be helpful in an 
emergency situation. For example, if an employer knew that an employee carried a 
gene that made her susceptible to developing diabetes and the employee passed out 
on the factory floor, the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s genetic propensity 
for diabetes could be valuable to emergency and other medical personnel.  
III.  POOLED GENETIC INFORMATION 
A.  Identifying Diseases That a Significant Number of Employees are Susceptible to 
Developing  
Many of the concerns about genetic discrimination disappear if employees’ 
genetic information is pooled, i.e., when employers do not know the genetic traits of 
any individual employee, but instead have an overall genetic profile of their workers. 
There are a number of ways that pooled information could be valuable.  If employers 
knew, for example, that a significant number of their employees were susceptible to 
developing heart disease, they could put educational programs in place, have a 
nutritionist speak to employees about diet, or subsidize employees’ memberships to 
health clubs, all of which would have the same benefits as interventions based on 
individual level information without the accompanying risk of discrimination.13  The 
downside for employers of using pooled information is that, without knowing the 
specific individuals at risk, they would have to extend the benefits to all employees, 
not just those truly at risk.  Thus, interventions based on pooled information would 
not be as cost effective as individualized interventions.  On the other hand, 
promoting the overall health of all employees could be cost effective if it reduced 
absenteeism and healthcare costs.  
B.  Using Pooled Information to Reduce Insurance Costs 
Pooled information could be particularly valuable when it comes to insurance.  
Insurance is a system of cross-subsidies: healthy insureds subsidize less healthy 
insureds.14  If all employers pay the same rate for insurance regardless of the health 
risks presented by their employees, there can be an adverse selection problem.  For 
employers whose employees have an increased likelihood of becoming ill, the 
marginal benefit of insurance exceeds the marginal cost.  Conversely, for employers 
                                                                
13Of course, if the pooled risk was high enough, employers could fire all their employees 
and hope that the next pool of employees presented a reduced genetic risk. 
14Naomi Obinata, Genetic Screening and Insurance: Too Valuable an Underwriting Tool 
to Be Banned from the System, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 145, 146 
(1992). 
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whose employees have a relatively low risk of becoming seriously ill, the marginal 
cost of insurance often exceeds the marginal benefit.  In response to this 
phenomenon, employers with relatively healthy employees may elect to not provide 
health insurance coverage at all, and instead increase employees’ wages with 
resources that would otherwise be spent on health insurance.  Insurance companies, 
left with the less healthy workers, will in turn raise premiums to cover the cost of 
insuring the most risky people.  A second adverse selection problem arises if some 
employers provide health insurance coverage and others do not: Workers who are ill 
or likely to become ill will flock to the employers who offer health insurance. 15 
One way to eliminate or reduce this adverse selection problem would be to 
establish a risk-based pricing program, where employers’ insurance premiums would 
be based on the pooled risk presented by their cluster of employees.  Risk-based 
pricing is well established in the life and automobile insurance industries.  When you 
are older, you pay more for life insurance because you are more likely to die.  In 
most states, young males pay a premium for automobile insurance because 
collectively they present a greater risk of causing an accident than their female 
counterparts.  
The more accurately insurance companies assess risk, the more efficiently they 
can price policies and pass any savings on to customers.16  Genetic information has 
the potential to be a valuable tool for engaging in more accurate risk assessment and 
risk-based pricing.  For example, if insurance companies reviewed the genetic profile 
of each employer’s employees, they could then set prices based on the relative risk 
presented by each group of workers.  Employers whose employees had a relatively 
low pooled risk would pay less for their insurance.17  If employers were paying 
premiums based on the actual risk posed by their employees, the incentive for 
employers to elect not to provide health insurance on efficiency grounds is reduced.  
The downside of risk-based pricing is the less affluent tend to be less healthy, and 
poor health can trigger expression of genetic diseases.  Thus, charging on the basis of 
risk could create situations where those with the least assets pay the most for 
insurance.18  In addition, employers whose employees present a relatively high level 
of risk may opt to not provide any health insurance because of the cost. 
                                                                
15Rothstein, supra note 6, at 113.  
16Draper, supra note 3, at 289. 
17Other options include pricing insurance based on experience or community rating.  The 
problem with experience ratings is that they create an incentive for employers to deny 
employees health care, for example, by making the claims and approval processes 
cumbersome.   
Community rating is also not foolproof, but for different reasons.  With community rating, 
insurance costs are based on the prevailing medical and hospital costs in the area in which the 
insureds reside.  Under a community rating system, people who live in urban areas, where the 
cost of space and labor is higher, likely will pay higher premiums.  In areas where class and 
geography are closely linked, less affluent urban residents would pay more than their more 
affluent suburban counterparts.   
18There is another, more subtle, fairness issue.  People cannot control their genetic make-
ups as they can with other risk factors, such as smoking.  The question is whether it is fair to 
add the burden of higher insurance premiums on people who already have the burden of 
wondering whether they are going to develop potentially life-threatening diseases. 
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One solution to this problem would be to establish a discounting program in 
which employers who implement preventative health care programs in response to 
genetic information about their employees would receive a discount on their 
insurance premiums.19  This has the potential to reduce some of the cost differential 
between the high-risk and low-risk groups.20  I am not aware of anyone who has 
tested or modeled this idea and suspect that even the best of preventative health care 
programs will not sufficiently eliminate the cost difference.  Another option would 
be for the federal government to play a role, either by picking up the premium cost 
differential for employers whose employees present high risk levels or by 
establishing federally-sponsored high-risk pools that would provide health insurance 
coverage for workers at risk of developing serious diseases.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This exercise in switching sides of the table has made me realize that it is 
premature to endorse an all-out prohibition on employers’ access to any form of 
genetic information about their employees.  I say this for two reasons.  First, with 
adequate safeguards, employers could use genetic information in ways that would 
benefit employees, employers, and society.  Second, genetic testing is in its 
infancy.21  At this point, employers are not engaging in widespread genetic testing 
and discrimination so there is no immediate need to impose a ban to protect workers.  
During this period of learning and experimenting, there is an opportunity for us to 
craft a solution to the problem of genetic discrimination before it comes a reality.  
And, in so doing, I suggest that we keep in mind the possibility that employers could 
use genetic information for socially productive purposes. 
                                                                
19Auto insurance companies and health insurance companies offer rate reductions on an 
individualized basis, e.g., reduced rates for drivers whose cars have airbags, and health 
insurance rate reductions for non-smokers.  Obinata, supra note 14, at 60. 
20Of course, the cost differential might persist if the insurer offered the same rate 
discounting program to employers whose employees were not high risk. 
21See T.H. Cushing, Should There Be Genetic Testing in Insurance Risk Classification?, 
60 DEF. COUNS. J. 249, 252 (1993) (discussing the limited utility of extant genetic testing). 
